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ABSTRACT
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed into law by President
Obama in 2010, health insurance coverage was expanded to 20 million previously
uninsured people. Of these, 14.5 million were Medicaid eligible. Moral Hazard, a common
research topic in insurance, is defined as when the private actions of an individual in a
risk-sharing situation influence the probability of the outcome. There are two types of
moral hazard, called ex-post moral hazard and ex-ante moral hazard. In the case of health
insurance, ex-post moral hazard is when a health behavior changes after an individual
becomes insured. Ex-ante moral hazard, which is what is being investigated in this paper,
is when a behavior changes and potentially causes a health event. This paper considers
that ex-ante moral hazard developed in the portion of the population insured by Medicaid
following its expansion in 24 states. A difference-in-difference model is used to compare
these 24 states to the 18 that have not voted to expand Medicaid. There are eight states
which are excluded from the model because the legislatures of these states voted to
expand Medicaid after the January 1, 2014 deadline. The data came from the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System, which is maintained by the Centers for Disease Control.
I examine the rate of seat belt use as a risky health behavior in expansion states versus
non-expansion states to determine if there is a difference resulting from moral hazard.
Results show that there is no decrease in seatbelt use associated with the expansion of
Medicaid.
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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Health insurance has become an increasingly prevalent issue in American
society today. A major goal of President Obama’s first administration was to establish
effectively “universal health insurance”—a country where 100% of individuals were
covered by some form of health insurance, whether that be public or private (Jung &
Tran, 2016). With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
in 2010, health insurance coverage expanded to over 20 million additional people who
were not previously covered (Jung & Tran, 2016). The expansion was enabled by
allowing individuals to remain covered by their parent’s insurance plan until age 26, the
development of marketplaces, prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage
on the basis of a pre-existing condition, not allowing insurance companies to revoke
coverage at the time a service is required, and expanding Medicaid by enacting less
stringent qualification requirements. Of the 20 million individuals who became covered
because of the provisions of the ACA, 14.5 million were Medicaid eligible (Jung & Tran,
2016; Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2017). Research suggests
that expansions of health insurance induced by the ACA have increased insurance
coverage rates, improved utilization and improved health. However, the ACA may
inadvertently have negatively impacted health through moral hazard.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between health
insurance and risky health behaviors. Historically, research into the notion of a change
in risky behavior due to insurance coverage has been inconclusive. However, the group
of individuals which became covered because of the Medicaid expansion have not been
studied to see if the effects of moral hazard are apparent. As documented in Dong
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(2013), the traditional causalities studied are the ex-post moral hazard effect of health
insurance on the use of health care, and the selection effect of the use of health care on
health insurance. Dong argues that the complete picture must incorporate health-related
behaviors, and not just health insurance and propensity to use health care. Dong’s
argument is that health insurance has a true moral hazard effect on health-related
behaviors, and that health-related behaviors have a selection effect on health
insurance. This selection effect is adverse selection—meaning that individuals choose
their health insurance based on their own health behavior, and is also documented by
Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf and Cullen (2013). These health behaviors are
usually not known to the insurer, thus creating an asymmetrical distribution of
information.
The true moral hazard effect described by Dong is defined by Holmstrom (1979)
as “when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately
taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome”, meaning that one party
decides to take an action for which another party bears the cost of a negative outcome
resulting from that action. In the case of health insurance, this can be interpreted as if
one’s health insurance will pay or help pay for one’s care, one may take more risks or
be less cautious about their behaviors because he or she knows that any negative
health outcome will be covered (Dave & Kaestner, 2008). This is called ex-ante moral
hazard—meaning a behavior changed after an individual became covered by health
insurance and will be the focus of the investigation described in this paper. An example
of ex-ante moral hazard specifically is an individual, who was previously cautious
regarding their health because they were exposed to the negative financial
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consequences and the loss of utility, becoming more reckless about their health after
they become insured. In the case of the Medicaid expansion brought on by the ACA,
which is the subject of this paper, we are interested in determining if this effect is
apparent within the group of individuals who received Medicaid coverage as of 1
January 2014.
Medicaid, which is a publicly-funded form of health insurance and was created
under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, provides insurance to individuals
who fall below a certain income level and are not otherwise covered with health
insurance by their employer or any other source, such as family members or significant
others. Historically, Medicaid was intended to be used primarily by low-income single
mothers. While anyone falling below the threshold for Medicaid is qualified, the
expansion affected mostly single, childless males. Upon passage of the ACA, called
colloquially “Obamacare”, three of the most significant reforms to the American health
care system since the introduction of Medicaid in 1965 took effect. The three reforms
are first, regulations were put in place which prohibited health insurance providers to
deny coverage to an individual based on a pre-existing condition. They are required to
determine premiums based primarily on age. Second, an individual mandate to
purchase insurance was established. This mandate requires all individuals to be
covered by health insurance, whether it is through the state “exchanges” set up due to
the law, through an employer or through Medicaid. Finally, the law raised the level at
which individuals will no longer qualify for Medicaid (Simon, Soni & Cawley, 2017;
Courtemanche et al., 2017).The Medicaid expansion, while not an expansion of the kind
of coverage that is being provided, is an expansion in that more individuals will become
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eligible for the program. The Medicaid threshold became 133 percent of the federal
poverty level and it removed the asset test, which was an asset ceiling that an
individual’s asset holdings could not exceed if they were to be Medicaid eligible (Jung &
Tran, 2016; Simon et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 2017).
While health insurance does not decrease the total cost of any health service, it
does decrease the cost to the individual, which may allow them to access services more
frequently than if they had to pay the full cost of those services on the margin. As a
result, health insurance may make individuals healthier because accessing health
services more frequently can make an individual healthier (Kelly & Markowitz, 2009).
However, unnecessary or excessive visits to healthcare providers will run up costs for
insurance providers and health care providers at a much higher rate than the individual
accessing the services. This may make health insurance more expensive in the long
run, resulting in some poorer people being priced out of the health care if they are
uninsured and forcing them to obtain insurance through Medicaid (Courtemanche et al.,
2017). Rising costs of health insurance and decreasing numbers of individuals covered
by employers created a gap in insurance coverage among people who were too wealthy
to be previously covered by Medicaid, but were uncovered by private insurance. With
the expansion of Medicaid in 2014, more individuals became eligible for this public
health insurance, necessitating study of the unintended effects of this new coverage.
In theory, the significance of moral hazard seems to be very large, but in
practice, it has been found to be relatively insignificant and difficult to prove (Dave &
Kaestner, 2009; Kelly & Markowitz, 2017). This is due in part to the fact that many forms
of health insurance offer incomplete coverage. Even if a consumer is protected from the
4

monetary loss of a negative health event, such as the cost of medical expenditures and
lost earnings, he or she will not be protected from the utility loss (Kenkel, 2000). This
uncovered loss of utility, Kenkel argues, is enough to prevent ex-ante moral hazard from
developing in the insured population. However, the population to which Medicaid was
expanded under the Affordable Care Act is a population which was largely uninsured
prior to that expansion (Dong, 2012). There is reason to believe that this group,
comprised of low-income individuals, will have a change in behaviors because of the
expansion because this group was unlikely to be covered by private insurance before
the expansion. Specifically, if they were accessing health services before, they can do
so at a much lower personal cost and if they were not accessing health services, they
now can do so at little to no personal cost. This change in circumstance and increase in
disposable income for some may encourage a change in behavior and the existence of
ex-ante moral hazard, which has not been seen before.
In developed countries, morbidity and mortality are more often the result of
chronic health behaviors rather than infectious diseases (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011).
Meginning and Foege (2011) estimated that in 1990, one half of the deaths in the
United States were a result of “external modifiable risk factors”, or behaviors. These
behaviors include, for example, smoking, obesity, alcohol use, and seat belt usage. The
outcome of interest will be the comparison of states which did expand Medicaid to those
which did not, while controlling for these variations in population subgroups, like race,
ethnicity and sex. This examination will provide insight into the influence of expanded
health insurance on the behaviors of low-income individuals, specifically into if it has
caused an increase in risky behaviors. Cawley and Ruhm establish that there are a
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variety of factors which can influence health outcomes, including occupation, education
and income, among others. These individual characteristics will be controls in this
analysis. For this investigation, the health behavior of interest will be seat belt usage.
Not utilizing a seatbelt when riding in a car is considered a risky health behavior
(Cawley & Ruhm, 2017), and is considered an external modifiable risk factor by
Meginning and Foege because it is a lifestyle choice. Seatbelt usage is an appropriate
variable with which to measure ex-ante moral hazard because it captures the rate of
reckless driving behavior, which is associated with negative health outcomes. Motor
vehicle accidents are a leading cause of death for adults in America. Many injuries,
including the most severe which require the highest level of medical treatment, are the
result of not wearing a seat belt. Wearing a seat belt does not guarantee an injury
requiring medical attention, much like wearing a seat belt does not guarantee an injury
free accident. However, not using a seat belt it is associated with negative health
outcomes (McDonald, Sommers, & Fargo 2014).

MODEL & DATA
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveilance System (BRFSS) is a telephone-based
survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and compiled into a publicuse dataset available online through the CDC website. It is a pooled cross-sectional
survey, with data available for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and territories of
the United States beginning in 1984. At the time of this paper, the latest year available
is 2016. This study examines the years 2010 through 2016 and usually has between
380,000 and 430,000 unique responses per year. For this time frame, there was a total
of 2,770,687 individual observations. Additionally, this survey captures a diverse
6

representation of the population of the United States. There are respondents from
varying income and education levels, ages, genders, and other socioeconomic factors.
Regardless of an individual’s demographic characteristics, the survey asks respondents
to answer a variety of questions about their health, including health behaviors, such as
alcohol consumption, smoking, and seatbelt usage. Alcohol consumption and smoking
are health behaviors which have been studied in great depth, while seatbelt usage has
not been examined so carefully, and not in the context of ex-ante moral hazard.
One would expect that if ex-ante moral hazard had developed in the Medicaideligible portion of the population following the expansion of the program, the rate at
which individuals wear seatbelts would be lower in the expansion states when
compared to the non-expansion states. Many locales engage in extensive public health
campaigns meant to increase the use of seatbelts. Police departments also engage in
strict enforcement of existing laws with steep penalties, which are used to motivate
individuals to wear a seatbelt (Hedlund, Gilbert, Ledingham, & Preusser 2008). If exante moral hazard developed, it would be despite these initiatives.
The BRFSS includes a question about an individual’s seat belt use. The question
from which the variable of interest is derived asks respondents to state how often they
wear a seatbelt when they ride in a car, from “never” to “always”, and includes an option
for those who never ride in automobiles. The calculated variable used in this
investigation grouped respondents into two categories—those who always or nearly
always wear seatbelts, and those who seldom or never wear seatbelts, or never ride in
cars.
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A difference-in-differences model is used to predict the rate of seatbelt usage for
an individual. The advantage of utilizing this kind of model is that it allows for the use of
a pseudo-natural experiment from observational data. Controls for education, marital
status, and employment status in the home were included. For the controls, did not
finish high school, married, and employed were the comparison groups for education
level, marital status, and employment status, respectively.
State-fixed effects and year-fixed effects were also included. The purpose of
including the state and year fixed effects is to capture any difference in seat belt usage
rates resulting from exogeneous factors affecting only respondents from a single state,
or responses coming from a single year. The other control variables are socioeconomic
factors which have an established effect on health behavior (Zimmerman, Woolf &
Haley 2015). The model is shown below:
Seatbelt= β(expand)+ β(post)+ β(expandpost)+ β(race)+ β(marital status)+
β(employment status)+ β(education)+ β(year-fixed effects)+ β(state-fixed effects)+μ+ε
To capture the Medicaid-eligible portion of the population in the model, the
sample was limited to individuals with a reported income of less than $25,000 and under
the age of 65. While individuals older than age 65 may be Medicaid-eligible depending
on the state in which they live and other individual characteristics, it is assumed for this
paper that most of their insurance would come from Medicare, not Medicaid. 36% of all
Medicaid spending is on dual-eligible enrollees, but 65% of this spending is long-term,
which is not usually covered by Medicare (Young, Garfield, Musumeci, Clemans-Cope,
& Lawton, 2013). Because these services are medically necessary, over-utilization due
to ex-ante moral hazard would likely not develop here. Additionally, because these
8

services make up the majority of spending on dual eligible individuals, and there is no
way to distinguish between spending on long term care and acute care, all individuals
older than age 65 who qualify for Medicaid are excluded, as not to influence the results.
Excluding the District of Columbia, of the 50 states, 24 had adopted the
expansion by January 1, 2014. Refer to Appendix A for a map indicating which states
had or not adopted the Medicaid expansion. These states will form the treatment group.
Regardless of the actual date a state chose to adopt the Medicaid expansion, if the
successful vote to adopt occurred before 1 January 2014, the expanded coverage
became effective on that date. There are 8 states which adopted the expansion after
that date (Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Alaska, Montana, Louisiana and
Maine) which will be excluded from this analysis due to lack of sufficient post-expansion
data. There are 18 states which did not expand Medicaid prior to January 1, 2014 and
have not expanded since that date. These states will form the control or comparison
group. Using these groups, the states will be compared to themselves year-to-year
before and after the expansions, and the groups will be compared to each other before
and after 2014. The years 2010-2013 will be used to establish the baseline for all the
states. 2014 through 2016 will be the years for the “treatment” group of 24 states which
did expand Medicaid.
The literature indicates that men and women have differing attitudes towards
risky health behaviors (Dawson, Schneider, Fletcher, & Bryden, 2007; Harris, Jenkins, &
Glaser 2006; McDonald, Sommers, & Fargo, 2014). Having children in the home can
also impact the health behaviors of the parents. For that reason, separate regressions
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will be run for men and women with and without children, so that the effects of gender
and children can be better examined.

RESULTS
For seat belt use, it is not unreasonable to assume that, without the expansion in
Medicaid, that the trend of increasing use over time would continue in both expansion
and non-expansion states. As established, continuing enforcement of existing laws,
public health campaigns, and changing public sentiment would likely continue to
influence the rate of seat belt use, regardless of the Medicaid expansion. Ex-ante moral
hazard would be shown by a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
“Expandpost” variable.
“Expand” is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if and only if the respondent
lives in one of the 24 states which voted to expand. “Post” is a binary variable which is
equal to one if and only if the response comes from after 2014. “Expandpost”, which is
“Expand” * “Post”, measures the difference in seat belt use resulting from being a part of
the treatment group.
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The table shown below is for the variables of most significant interest. Refer to
appendix B for the complete output.
Table 1

Expand

Post

Expandpost

-.113***

.03***

-.007

(.0039)

(.0106)

(.008)

Male
Without
Children
N=108,003
R2=.0297
With Children

-.170***

.0002

-.004

(.0067)

(.012)

(.009)

N=39,692
R2=.0438

Note: In addition to variables listed, the model included state fixed effects, year fixed effects, education,
race, marital status, and employment status. * indicates significance at the .10 level, ** indicates
significance at the .05 level, and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. All standard errors, listed in
parentheses, are robust standard errors.

Table 1 shows the results for Males. Column 1, corresponding to the “Expand”
variable, shows a 17-percentage point decrease in seat belt use for males with children
resulting from living in an Expansion state. While not investigated in this study, these
states may have common practices regarding the enforcement of existing seatbelt laws.
It has been indicated that the most effective way to raise seat belt use is to have highvisibility seat belt law enforcement, as opposed to any awareness campaign spending
or demographic characteristics of a state (Hedlund et al., 2008). The cause of the
observed decrease here may be related to this, but should be studied further to better
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understand the true cause. A similar but smaller in magnitude decrease of 11
percentage points is also observed in Males without children.
Column 2 measures the change in seat belt usage resulting from a response
from after 2014 compared to a response from before 2014. For both males without and
with children, there is an observed increase of 3% and .005%. While only the increase
of 3% for males without children is statistically significant, the positive values of this
variable indicate that seat belt use is rising over time, perhaps due to the same increase
in enforcement over time. There is an opportunity for future study here to endeavor to
explain this increase over time, along with the difference in seat belt use in expansion
versus non-expansion states.
For this study, the variable of most important interest is Expandpost. There are
.06% and .034% decreases in seat belt use for males with and without children,
respectively, associated with this variable. Although neither case is statistically
significant, the negative sign of the value would indicate a moral hazard effect.
However, given the small magnitude of the changes and their statistical insignificance,
the conclusion must be that there is not sufficient evidence to indicate higher risky
behavior resulting from ex-ante moral hazard, as measured by seat belt use. As
established, there may be exogeneous factors not included here which have an
influence on seat belt use. Awareness campaigns, while not the most effective way to
increase usage, are common in many locales and not thought to be ineffective.
Generally measured by spending, these campaigns were not included in the model.
Inclusion of these in the future iterations of this design provides an opportunity to better
explain the results shown here.
12

Table 2

Expand

Post

Expandpost

-.067***

-.001

-.002

(.003)

(.005)

(.004)

Female
Without
Children
N=138,248
R2=.0210
With Children

-.046***

.007

.000

(.002)

(.005)

(.004)

N=98,275
R2=.0243

Note: In addition to variables listed, the model included state fixed effects, year fixed effects, education,
race, marital status, and employment status. * indicates significance at the .10 level, ** indicates
significance at the .05 level, and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. All standard errors, listed in
parentheses, are robust standard errors.

For females, there are decreases of 6.7% and 4.6% for those without children
and with children, respectively, resulting from living in an expansion state. While the
magnitude of these changes is smaller than magnitude of the changes for men, the
decrease is likely resulting from the same reason as males.
The post variable for females shows slight decrease of .01% for those without
children and .07% increase for those with children. Neither of these percentages are
statistically significant from 0. Generally, this shows that seat belt use is at least
increasing over time, although there may be no change.
The expand post variable for females is not statistically significantly different from
0, much like for males. However, for females with children, expand post is effectively
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equal to 0 after rounding. This shows that there is evidence to indicate that Medicaid
has no impact on the health behaviors of females with children.
Overall, the results indicate that there is little evidence to suggest that lowincome individuals are engaging in riskier behavior at a higher rate in expansion states
because of the Medicaid expansion.

DISCUSSION
Because moral hazard controls cannot be imposed on the insured individual
covered by Medicaid, the results of this paper indicate that, on the national level, exante moral hazard is not an issue. There is evidence to suggest that there is no
increase in risky health behavior resulting from the expansion of Medicaid.
The significantly lower rates of seatbelt use for childless males and females in
expansion states compared to non-expansion states is difficult to concretely explain.
The results may have been skewed by the relatively small sample size in some states,
but further study would be required to identify an appropriate explanation for this
difference. Increasing seat belt use over time, which is suggested by the “post” variable,
is an outcome which individuals will likely find positive, but further study will also be
required here to identify the cause of this success.
Understanding the reason why there is no evidence to indicate a moral hazard
effect is important to policy makers as they try to understand what aspects of Medicaid
policy have been successful. The lack of ex-ante moral hazard in this sample can be
explained in-part by the principal-agent problem. Physicians, as agents of their patients,
have a larger responsibility for health care costs than patients, because physicians
14

control most medical expenditures. In many cases, as a part of managed care,
physicians are reimbursed a fixed amount per patient, called a capitation payment. This
payment is meant to control costs, moral hazard and reduce supplier-induced demand.
Medicaid, along with numerous other private insurance plans, uses capitation payments
for this purpose. However, Medicaid has relatively low captiation payments compared to
these private insurance plans. As a result, physicians are often less likely to take on
new Medicaid patients, and, when they do, there is an incentive to provide as few
services as possible (Decker, 2012). With significant difficulty accessing care because
physicians choose not to take on new Medicaid patients and, when they do, they usually
do not prescribe large volumes of care, individuals insured by Medicaid cannot afford to
take unnecessary risk, because accessing treatment is difficult. While ease of access
varies by state, this would help to explain the lack of evidence of a moral hazard effect
in this study.
An additional explanation for the lack of evidence of moral hazard is that of the
14.5 million new individuals covered by Medicaid, some may have been previously
covered by private insurance. The ACA, in addition to allowing more people to join the
program based on income, allowed individual states to improve the quality of their
Medicaid programs, which may result in Medicaid crowd-out. If this is the case, then
some portion of the individuals covered by Medicaid would not be new to an insurance
plan. These individuals would likely have established behaviors that would not change
when they switched between a low-quality private plan and a low-quality public plan. Exante moral hazard would not develop because the level of quality would be consistent
despite the change in insurance provider. The extra income saved by not having to pay
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for the individuals own premium, co-payment, or deductible would likely not be enough
to induce a change in behavior because the low-quality nature of the plan they are
leaving is likely associated with a small cost. The result would be only a small increase
in disposable income, except in cases of catastrophic illness or injury.
There is some evidence to indicate that, in some states, Medicaid does induce
covered individuals to utilize more care. This is unsurprising, as one of the most
common reasons for not accessing care is the cost associated with it. Additional factors
include the ease of access to care, which was not addressed by the Medicaid
expansion provision of the 2010 ACA. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, for
example, showed that there was a 40% increase in emergency department visits in
covered individuals when compared to those eligible for Medicaid who were not covered
(Finkelstein et al 2012, Taubman et al 2014). While this would appear to be a moral
hazard effect, it is possible that this can be explained by the relative difficulty individuals
have accessing primary care through Medicaid. Because physicians are willing to take
on so few new Medicaid patients, this could be explained by many patients receiving
care through emergency departments instead of through a primary care physician. The
capitation paid by the government to providers, usually through managed care
organizations but sometimes directly through fee-for-service from the state, is often a
fraction of the rate that provider would receive from a private insurance company. In
some cases, for some services, the government payment rate may be less than the cost
to provide the service. This may induce some primary care providers to limit the number
of new Medicaid patients they will take, as it may be done at a net loss. With the relative
difficulty in accessing primary care, many patients may wait until their need for medical
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care becomes an emergency or may treat the emergency room as a primary care office,
inefficiently overutilizing emergency care. Regardless, if any of these are the case, the
inelastic demand for emergency medical care would result in little, if any, moral hazard.
The expansion of Medicaid, while it increased the number of individuals who had
insurance and could access care, did not address the structural barriers that exist to
accessing care in the system, especially for those who are publicly insured. This would
help to explain the lack of evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. If patients know that the
majority of their care is going to come only in an emergency, it is likely that they would
not have riskier health behavior once becoming insured because of the significant loss
of utility from being in an emergency room. The lack of evidence to indicate moral
hazard, found in this study, would support the idea that the observed increase in
utilization in Oregon and across the country is not the result of moral hazard.

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE STUDY
The BRFSS, while an accessible and relatively simple to use data set, has
limitations based on the methods used to collect data. By basing the survey on
responses from land-line and cellular telephones, the results may inadvertently exclude
the poorest portion of the population, as these individuals may not possess these
methods of communication at as high a rate as wealthier people. This is particularly
problematic for this study because the focus of the investigation is the very poor.
While most Americans ride or drive regularly in a car, but the poorest Americans
are the most unlikely group for this to be true (Tomer, 2011). Therefore, by using seat
belt usage to measure risky health behaviors, the poorest individuals, who would also
be affected by the Medicaid expansion, may have been excluded because seat belt use
17

may not affect them. Furthermore, the BRFSS does not include any questions asking
the specific source of an individual’s health insurance coverage, if any. This
necessitates the assumption that everyone who qualifies for Medicaid is enrolled in the
program, which is not likely to be true. The assumption was based on the reported
income of a respondent, and because the reported income is broken down into
categories which sometimes include both individuals who do and do not qualify for
Medicaid, this assumption is inherently flawed.
Additionally, there is a limited amount of data after the expansion took effect. As
more data becomes available, the analysis should be repeated so that the effects can
be more accurately determined. Because states are free to decide the quality and
quantity of the Medicaid program in their state, there is no true “one size fits all”
measurement of qualifying for the program. Ideally, this study would be repeated once
more data becomes available for all 50 states, and would be designed in a way such
that each states’ unique qualifications for the program were included.
While seat belt usage may be an effective way to determine the how risky an
individual is regarding his or her health, it may not be the best measure of moral hazard.
The link between the consequences of wearing or not wearing a seat belt on an
individual’s health is not as clear as the link would be for smoking or drinking behavior.
Seatbelt use is also habitual—it may be unlikely that an individual would change this
health behavior because they became insured. The lack of evidence for moral hazard
could be due to the choice of the dependent variable, and not because the program is
truly designed in a way that limits ex-ante moral hazard.
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CONCLUSION
Moral hazard in Medicaid poses a significant problem for policy makers. Typical
moral hazard controls, such as co-payments and deductibles, cannot be used in
Medicaid because the intended recipients of the benefit are very poor, and as such are
unlikely to be able to afford these payments. The likely result would be underutilization
of care, which is socially undesirable in the same way that overutilization due to moral
hazard would be socially undesirable. Medicaid is thought to improve health outcomes,
which is something that society values. Balancing the quality of the program with the
need for an efficient use of public dollars is a key issue for policy makers, and avoiding
a program which creates moral hazard by increasing risky health behavior in a way
which makes needing treatment more likely is a key part of creating this efficiency. The
results of this study indicate that seat belt use in low-income populations is increasing
over time, and that there is little evidence to indicate that there is an ex-ante moral
hazard effect resulting from the Medicaid expansion.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Map of the Current Status of the Medicaid Expansion, courtesy of the
Kaiser

Family

Foundation
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Appendix B: Sample Regression (Men without Children)
Linear regression

Number of obs

=

F(19, 41)

=

.

Prob > F

=

.

108,003

R-squared

=

0.0293

Root MSE

=

.29404

seatbelt

Coef.

Robust Std. Err. t

P>t

expand

-.1126786 .0038759

-29.07 0.000 -.1205061 -.1048511

post

.0265936 .009998

2.66

0.011 .0064023

expandpost -.0067769 .0077715

-0.87

0.388 -.0224718 .008918

_Istatea4

.0635656 .0027888

22.79 0.000 .0579335

.0691977

_Istatea5

.0595242 .0017741

33.55 0.000 .0559414

.063107

_Istatea6

.1456373 .0039083

37.26 0.000 .1377444

.1535302

_Istatea8

.0796524 .0022194

35.89 0.000 .0751702

.0841346

_Istatea9

.1117737 .0022036

50.72 0.000 .1073235

.1162239

_Istatea10

.1466495 .0024815

59.10 0.000 .141638

.151661
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[95% Conf. Interval]

.0467849

_Istatea12

-.0069787 .0020262

-3.44

_Istatea13

-.0203985 .0009816

-20.78 0.000 -.0223809 -.0184162

_Istatea15

.1397264 .0038957

35.87 0.000 .131859

_Istatea16

-.0658371 .0031785

-20.71 0.000 -.0722562 -.0594181

_Istatea17

.1164988 .00273

42.67 0.000 .1109854

.1220122

_Istatea19

.1261013 .0006692

188.43 0.000 .1247498

.1274528

_Istatea20

-.0561063 .0022041

-25.45 0.000 -.0605576 -.0516549

_Istatea21

.0727147 .0015112

48.12 0.000 .0696628

.0757666

_Istatea24

.1342141 .0037067

36.21 0.000 .1267282

.1416999

_Istatea25

-.0035511 .0014633

-2.43

_Istatea27

.1240281 .0006944

178.62 0.000 .1226258

_Istatea28

-.0310193 .0017687

-17.54 0.000 -.0345912 -.0274474

_Istatea29

-.1339456 .0019

-70.50 0.000 -.1377828 -.1301084

_Istatea31

-.1515018 .0023475

-64.54 0.000 -.1562427 -.1467609

_Istatea32

.0954327 .0025652

37.20 0.000 .0902521

.1006132

_Istatea34

.1181497 .003282

36.00 0.000 .1115216

.1247778

22

0.001 -.0110706 -.0028867

.1475938

0.020 -.0065063 -.0005959
.1254305

_Istatea35

.1294629 .0044083

29.37 0.000 .1205601

.1383656

_Istatea36

.1046654 .0027112

38.60 0.000 .09919

.1101407

_Istatea37

.0305319 .0010908

27.99 0.000 .0283291

.0327348

_Istatea39

.0295563 .001374

21.51 0.000 .0267814

.0323311

_Istatea40

-.0125714 .0020058

-6.27

_Istatea41

.1513114 .0013451

112.49 0.000 .148595

.1540278

_Istatea44

.0717797 .0018958

37.86 0.000 .0679511

.0756083

_Istatea45

.0086944 .0006018

14.45 0.000 .0074791

.0099098

_Istatea46

-.1858925 .0028236

-65.84 0.000 -.1915949 -.1801901

_Istatea47

-.0214432 .0018385

-11.66 0.000 -.0251561 -.0177303

_Istatea48

.0158675 .0035842

4.43

_Istatea49

-.0519991 .0028257

-18.40 0.000 -.0577057 -.0462926

_Istatea50

.0435969 .000906

48.12 0.000 .0417673

_Istatea51

-.0465486 .0009402

-49.51 0.000 -.0484475 -.0446498

_Istatea53

.1487252 .0014036

105.96 0.000 .1458905

.1515598

_Istatea54

.048686

35.16 0.000 .0458899

.0514822

.0013846

23

0.000 -.0166223 -.0085205

0.000 .008629

.023106

.0454265

_Istatea55

-.0759556 .0022212

-34.20 0.000 -.0804414 -.0714698

_Istatea56

-.1482124 .0028463

-52.07 0.000 -.1539606 -.1424642

_Iyeara2011 .0162609 .0104624

1.55

0.128 -.0048684 .0373901

_Iyeara2012 .0129174 .0085699

1.51

0.139 -.0043897 .0302246

_Iyeara2013 .0124172 .0105863

1.17

0.248 -.0089624 .0337967

_Iyeara2014 -.0100759 .0073864

-1.36

0.180 -.0249931 .0048413

_Iyeara2015 .0027875 .005393

0.52

0.608 -.0081039 .0136788

black

.0055657 .0096162

0.58

0.566 -.0138546 .0249859

otherrace

-.0032393 .007377

-0.44

0.663 -.0181374 .0116588

multirace

.0027165 .0119041

0.23

0.821 -.0213243 .0267572

hispanic

.0291738 .0085662

3.41

0.001 .011874

divorced

-.0139387 .0049077

-2.84

0.007 -.0238499 -.0040275

widowed

.0055927 .0075849

0.74

0.465 -.0097254 .0209108

separated

-.0163073 .0066949

-2.44

0.019 -.0298279 -.0027867

never

-.0261657 .0047525

-5.51

0.000 -.0357636 -.0165678

othermarital -.0021532 .0068607

-0.31

0.755 -.0160087 .0117022

24

.0464736

hsgrad

.0133827 .0053735

2.49

0.017 .0025307

.0242346

college

.0381487 .0067024

5.69

0.000 .024613

.0516844

collegegrad .0570446 .0088675

6.43

0.000 .0391363

.0749529

unemploy

.0059527 .0042666

1.40

0.170 -.0026638 .0145692

_cons

.8830746 .0124165

71.12 0.000 .857999

25

.9081503
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